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* * * * * * *
The problem of information asymmetry is at the core of all
financing transactions.  It is almost inevitable that the party
seeking funds will possess information not already known to the
parties that might provide funds.  Because the information
asymmetry increases the costs of the transaction – the lender
should charge more to accommodate the risks associated with
the borrower’s informational advantage – any arrangement that
mitigates the information asymmetry has the potential to lower
the costs of the transaction.
Parties faced with that problem can respond in any
number of ways.  The simplest response would be to leave the
problem unresolved, accepting the premium that the lender
                                                                
* © 1999 by Ronald J. Mann.  Professor of Law, The University of
Michigan Law School.  I am grateful for helpful comments from Becky Eisenberg,
Dan Keating, Adam Pritchard, and Peter Swire, as well as participants in the Law
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would charge as a cost of the transaction.  Alternatively, the
lender might expend funds to ascertain the relevant information
directly (through a tedious process of “due diligence”).
Often, however, businesses can use some mechanism to
verify the truth of the borrower’s assertions, mechanisms that
generally might be called verification institutions.1  From the
perspective of the legal system as a whole, those institutions
range along a spectrum from mechanisms provided by the law –
a suit for misrepresentation or fraud, for example2 – to
mechanisms that operate almost completely outside the law,
such as reputational sanctions.3  In between fall such institutions
as secured credit, for which legal recourse is formally part of the
arrangement, but not demonstrably crucial to the effectiveness
of the institution.4
If we believe that commercial enterprises in the longer run
generally design their transactions so as to minimize the costs of
such information problems, then the parties to those transactions
generally should select the mechanism that best resolves the
information problem at the lowest cost.5  Thus, two features of
the current environment suggest that the current set of
institutions is unstable.  The first of those is a general rise in the
costs of legal sanctions, reflected in the increasing pecuniary
                                                                
1 For a thorough analysis of those institutions as they currently exist,
see Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financial Transactions, 87
GEORGETOWN L.J. 2225 (1999) [hereinafter Mann, Verification Institutions].
2 See Mann, Verification Institutions, supra note 1, at 2248-49
(discussing the suit for misrepresentation as a type of verification institution).
3 See Mann, Verification Institutions, supra note 1, at 2252-57
(discussing the mechanics of reputational sanctions).
4 See Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured
Debt, 96 MICH. L. REV. 159, 221-32 (1997) (discussing case studies illustrating
the generally limited usefulness of foreclosure and repossession on secured
loans).
5 The assumption of rational transaction design obviously is less
plausible for consumer transactions than for commercial transactions.  But even
in consumer transactions there is reason to expect some rationality in transac-
tion design given the relatively competitive markets for providing financing to
consumers.
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costs of litigation as well as slowing rates of resolution of civil
disputes presented to the courts.6  The second is a general
decrease in the cost of acquiring, processing, and analyzing
information.  Taken together those two effects presage a sig-
nificant shift in the balance of institutions away from formal legal
sanctions – which are becoming more expensive and less
effective – to non-legal sanctions – which should become more
and more effective as information-related costs continue to fall.7
This essay elucidates that point by reference to four
separate areas in which advances in information technology
already have begun to alter the traditional institutions, leading in
each case to a rise in transactions that depend less heavily on
the traditional legal sanction associated with the older arrange-
ment.  I start by discussing the possibility that decreased infor-
mation costs will allow creditors to obtain information directly,
removing the uncertainty that created the information problem.
Next, I discuss how falling information costs support a general
increase in the feasibility of reputational sanctions.  My third
topic is the rise of securitization, which essentially uses infor-
mation technology to lower the costs of uncertainty through the
pooling and spreading of ever-greater risks.  Finally I discuss
the rise of the information merchant, specializing in the collec-
tion and sale of information of value to the prospective lender.
From a wholly economic perspective, the general
effectiveness of those various institutions is a cause for cele-
bration: it is difficult to see why they would succeed and spread
if they did not function by lowering the costs of information
problems, thus lowering the costs of funds to risky enterprises,
and thus in the end fostering the development and success of
those businesses.  One possible concern, however, is that the
spread of those institutions increases the value of ever more
                                                                
6 That point, of course, is well known.  See, e.g., Gillian Hadfield, The
Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System 1-2, 98
MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000).  I will not discuss it further here, but simply
assume it as part of the background against which I work.
7 For a spirited paean to the increasing significance of information, see
Peter F. Drucker, The Rise of the Knowledge Society, WILSON Q., Spring 1993, at
52.
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detailed information that might be relevant to the assessment of
the creditworthiness and more general reliability of individuals
and their enterprises.8
The message of this essay is that the privacy implications
of the Information Age cut in two directions.  We all share an
interest in limiting the intrusive collection and dissemination of
information about our affairs, but rules that hinder the flow of that
information easily can hinder the development of the cheaper
financing institutions that cheap information has fostered.  In an
era filled with lamentations about the high costs and inefficiency
of conventional litigation, we should think twice before stifling
nascent institutions that provide cheaper and more effective
devices for resolving information problems.
I.  DIRECT VERIFICATION OF INFORMATION
The most obvious effect of information technology is to
lower the costs of obtaining and analyzing information.  Although
cost reductions have a variety of less direct effects, the most
obvious is that in some cases they permit direct verification of
information.  Thus, in some cases a business now will be able to
design a transaction in a way that permits it to verify directly
information that in an earlier time could not practicably have
been acquired contemporaneously with the transaction in
question.  For those transactions, the need for a verification
institution (and its attendant costs) drops out entirely.
The checking system offers a fine and fluid example of
that process.  Merchants that accept checks for the most part
have to rely on the check-writer’s assertions that the check-
writer’s account contains sufficient funds to cover the check and
that the check-writer will permit use of those funds to cover the
check.  If those assertions turn out to be false – if the check
bounces – the merchant will suffer a loss.  It is not that the
                                                                
8 For a discussion of the types of information being collected, see Peter
P. Swire, Financial Privacy and the Theory of High-Tech Government Surveil-
lance, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 461, 464-69 (1999); Privacy, RED HERRING, Sept. 1999,
at 92 (unattributed column detailing particular types of information collected by
various websites).
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merchant has no remedy – if the merchant has performed its
side of the transactions, the merchant can file an action against
the customer seeking to recover the amount of the check.9
Alternatively, the merchant can pay a third party (a lawyer or
collection agent) to attempt to obtain the funds from the check-
writer.  But the sad truth is that neither of those courses of
action is likely to leave the merchant in a position as good as the
position in which the merchant would have been if the check had
been paid in due course in the first instance.  The loss to the
merchant from the bounced check – the unpaid amount and the
costs expended in collection efforts – arises inevi tably from the
merchant’s failure to verify the check-writer’s assertions at the
point of sale.
Because those costs are significant, many retail
merchants use a common verification institution to lower their net
losses from nonpayment of checks.  Specifically, they pay a
third party a small portion of every payment to verify the likeli-
hood of payment by determining whether the check-writer is
reliable.10  For example, in 1998 U.S. merchants verified 6.66
billion checks worth a total of about $338 billion.11  The process
is a simple one: at the point of sale an employee swipes the
check (capturing the customer’s bank account information) or
driver’s license, and transmits the information over a telephone
connection to the verification service, which examines whatever
information sources it maintains to determine if the transaction
                                                                
9 See U.C.C. §§ 3-310(b) (permitting holder of bounced check to pursue
drawer on underlying obligation), 3-414(b) (permitting holder to pursue drawer on
bounced check).  If that is impractical given the amount of the check (as it often
must be), the merchant’s recourse might be limited to referring the bad-check
writer for criminal prosecution, a course that costs the merchant less but also is
directed less pointedly at recovery of the merchant’s loss.
10 It is not clear to me why those services have not developed a way to
verify the account balance directly at the time of the transaction.  My best guess
is that banks would be unwilling to release that information to third parties,
although banks are happy to use it to implement their own debit-card products
discussed below.
11 Check Authorization 1998, THE NILSON REPORT, May 1999 (Issue 691),
at 1, 8.  That reflects a market penetration of just over 20 percent, given the 29.35
billion checks written in retail purchase transactions in 1998.  See Payment
Systems, NILSON REP., Dec. 1999 (Issue 706), at 1, 6.
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should be authorized.12  Those sources sometimes include
merely negative information (past bad checks and the like), but
in other cases they also include positive past credit information
or, in some cases, more sophisticated scoring systems.13  That
service is relatively inexpensive, generally costing a little less
than three cents per check.14
Some services, however, go farther, to include not merely
an assertion regarding past check-writing habits, but also a
guaranty: the service agrees that it will bear the loss that arises if
the check in fact is dishonored.  In 1998, check guarantee
services covered 785 million checks worth a total of $70 billion.
The process works much the same way, except that the service
agrees to bear the loss if the check bounces.  That service,
however is much more expensive, ranging from a low end of
1.0%-1.2% of the face amount of the check at a high-volume
and relatively low-risk merchant (such as a grocer) to a high end
of 5% at a casino or other high-risk merchant.15  Even those
services, of course, do not remove the cost entirely, but mer-
chants use them because the net effect of the service reduces
the aggregate losses from the unverified information more
effectively than the traditional method of a post-hoc lawsuit.16
Even the check-guaranty service, however, leaves the
merchant with a substantial loss from the incompletely verified
information (the cost of the service and the merchant’s share of
any remaining bad checks).  But new technologies have made it
practicable to reduce the losses from unverified payment com-
mitments much more completely, by providing payment systems
in which the consumer’s assertions about willingness and ability
                                                                
12 See Check Authorization 1998, supra note 11, at 9.
13 See Check Authorization 1998, supra note 11, at 9.
14 See Check Authorization 1998, supra note 11, at 8-9 (reporting
charges of $183 million to verify 6.6 billion checks worth $338.39 billion).
15 See Check Authorization 1998, supra note 11, at 8.
16 There also doubtless is some element of insurance, using the third
parties to spread the ineradicable element of the bad-check risk.  Given the large
size of many of the most prominent American retailing chains, however, I suspect
that the risk spreading element is a relatively small part of the transaction.
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to pay can be verified directly at the time of sale.  Although the
options are evolving rapidly,17 the most prominent success to
date is the point-of-sale debit card.
A debit card in appearance is indistinguishable from a
credit card, but the practical and legal consequences of a trans-
action that uses the debit card are quite different from those of a
credit-card transaction.  Technologically, the merchant that
accepts a debit card uses an on-line connection to the check-
writer’s financial institution to obtain a contemporaneous veri-
fication of the customer’s willingness and ability to pay.  Thus,
the merchant knows before the consumer leaves the register that
it will obtain payment for the transaction without further costs or
effort.18
Even more importantly, the network agreements among
the merchant, the merchant’s financial institution, the card
network, and the card-issuing bank do not provide any right of
chargeback.19  Applicable federal statutes draw a similar dis-
tinction, with the Electronic Funds Transfer Act permitting finality
in debit-card transactions while the Truth-in-Lending Act bars
                                                                
17 Two additional options that I do not discuss here are the stored-value
card and electronic money.  Although the stored-value card has become rea-
sonably popular in Europe, see Britain Sets Smart Card Plan To Beat Fraud
(Reuters Mar. 15, 1999), available at www.cnn.com (reporting plans for the
issuance of 100 million smart cards in Britain); Norway Group To Use Proton’s
Technology, AM. BANKER, Sept. 22, 1999, at 12, available at 1999 WL 21143501
(reporting programs using Proton brand smart cards in Norway, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Switzerland), it has not yet become a significant general
payment device in this country.  See RONALD J. MANN,  PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND
OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 256-67 (1999) (general discussion of stored-value
cards).  Electronic money is still farther from practical realization, but at least in
theory it would provide merchants in Internet transactions the same kind of
immediate verification of payment as the text discusses for debit cards.  See
MANN, supra, at 272-80; Jane Kaufman Winn, Clash of the Titans: Regulating the
Competition Between Established and Emerging Payment Systems, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 675, 691-702 (1999) (discussing reasons why electronic payment
systems have been slow to gain market share in this country).
18 See MANN, supra note 17, at 141-53 (general discussion of the
mechanics of debit-card transactions).
19 See MANN, supra note 17, at 116-21, 124-38, 146-53 (discussing
chargeback provisions in credit-card and debit-card network agreements).
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finality in credit-card transactions.20  Hence, unlike a credit-card
transaction (or, for that matter, a check transaction),21 the debit-
card transaction is functionally final at the moment of sale, with
no party having a later right to retrieve the payment from the
merchant except through the cumbersome device of a suit
claiming that the merchant breached its obligations in the
transaction.
The debit card as an idea has existed for decades.22  But
it had little practical significance at the point of sale until the last
few years, during which debit-card usage has skyrocketed.
Thus, debit cards were used for less than one percent of con-
sumer payment transactions in 1994, but almost five percent in
1998.23  To put that in sharper perspective, during that same
period debit-card usage rose from five percent of card-based
transactions to twenty-one percent.24  Industry analysts expect
                                                                
20 See MANN, supra note 17, at 116-21, 144-48.  I criticize that distinction
in a manuscript addressing the policy implications of technology changes for
consumer rights in payment systems.  See Ronald J. Mann, A Payments Policy
for the Information Age [hereinafter Mann, Payments Policy].
21 See U.C.C. § 4-403 (describing the customer’s right to stop payment).
The customer’s right to stop payment terminates when the customer’s bank
makes final payment of the check.  See U.C.C. § 4-403 (limiting the issuing
bank’s obligation to stop payment to situations in which it receives notice “at a
time and in a manner that affords the bank a reasonable opportunity to act on it
before any action by the bank [that would obligate the bank to pay the item under
U.C.C. § 4-303]”).  Hence, the decline in the time that it takes to collect checks,
especially local checks, has diminished considerably the value of the stop-
payment right in ordinary consumer retail transactions.  See MANN, supra note
17, at 42-54 (describing procedures that collect many local checks in a single
day); AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, CHECK FRAUD SURVEY REPORT: 1998, at 20,
32 tbl. 6 (reporting 1997 statistics indicating that 89% of banks make funds from
local checks available to business accounts on the same day or the next day
after the deposit).  Nevertheless, the right that remains still seems significantly
more favorable than the immediate finality that characterizes debit-card
transactions.
22 See DONALD I. BAKER & ROLAND E. BRAUDEL, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC
FUND TRANSFER SYSTEMS ¶7.02[1][a], at 7-2 to 7-5 (rev. ed. June 1996)
(discussing point-of-sale debit systems as early as 1966).
23 Consumer Payment Systems, NILSON REP., July 1995 (Issue 599), at 1,
6; Payment Systems, supra note 11, at 6.
24 See Debit Cards Defined, NILSON REP., Feb. 1995 (Issue 589), at 1, 5;
Card Transactions, NILSON REP., Dec. 1999 (Issue 706), at 1, 8-9.
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that rise to continue, with debit-card usage expected to overtake
credit-card usage by 2007.25  Even more importantly, the last
few years have seen the introduction of the first general-use
debit cards, operating under the Visa and MasterCard logos.
Those cards have contributed most of the rise in debit-card
usage.  Indeed, starting from less than 400 million transactions
in all of 1994 worth only $5 billion, by mid-1999 the Visa and
MasterCard systems already had grown to more than 42 million
active accounts, used during the first half of that year to
complete about 1.8 billion transactions worth more than $70
billion.26  It is difficult to identify all the causes for the timing of
the recent rise in debit-card usage, but it does seem clear that it
is attributable largely to the effects of information and
communications technology that have made it more and more
practical for merchants to maintain point-of-sale terminals with
contemporaneous dial-up connections on a register-by-register
basis.  Because the cards bring merchants a shorter checkout
time than checks and cheaper discounts than credit cards, it is
easy to see why merchants choose to accept them.27
As a practical matter, then, the advances in infrastructure
and technology that have fostered the broad rise of the debit
                                                                
25 See Card Transactions, supra note 24, at 9..
26 See U.S. General Purpose Cards, NILSON REP., Aug. 1999 (Issue 698),
at 1, 9-10; see alsoVisa and Mastercard – US 1998, NILSON REP., Apr. 1999
(Issue 689), at 1, 5-7 (more detailed statistics for the full 1998 year).
27 Charges on credit cards are in the range of 1.4% of the purchase price;
charges on traditional debit cards are in the range of 3 to 11 cents; charges on
the newer off-line debit cards offered by MasterCard and Visa are somewhere in
between (but significantly higher than traditional debit-card charges).  See
Charles Keenan, Debit Card Acceptance Heats up Feud over On-Line vs. Off-
Line Versions, AM. BANKER, Mar. 13, 1998, at 1, 12.  Perhaps the most unclear
thing about the debit card is why it is attractive to consumers.  Compared to the
credit card or the check, the consumer loses the float on the transaction.  Debit
cards also tend to have considerably smaller affinity programs.  Finally, although
most consumers doubtless are unaware of it, the protections for unauthorized
transactions under the Electronic Fund Transfers Act for debit cards are
considerably less generous than those for credit cards under the Truth-in-Lending
Act.  Compare EFTA § 909, 15 U.S.C. § 1693g (protections for debit cards) with
TILA § 133, 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (protections for credit cards).  For a general
discussion, see MANN, supra note 17, at 125-38, 148-53; see also Mann,
Payments Policy, supra note 20 (criticizing the formal legal distinction).
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card have lowered merchant verification costs by permitting the
merchant to substitute knowledge of contemporaneous payment
for the uncertain assertion of future payment that the merchant
receives in the checking system.  Conceptually, that direct
verification removes the need both for the third-party verification
provided by the existing check-guarantee services and for the
more primitive after-the-fact verification available to the merchant
doughty enough to sue the bad-check writer.  Although it is
difficult to quantify the cost advantages of that shift, the rapid
appearance of the soon-to-be ubiquitous point-of-sale debit-card
terminals suggests that the savings are substantial.
It is difficult to move from the checking example to a
broader generalization about areas in which information tech-
nology will lead to direct verification of information, but it is easy
to see two limitations.  The first is the nature of the transaction.
Direct verification of information can be helpful only in
transactions in which the information already exists at the time of
the transaction: transactions in which the assertion relates to
present or past occurrences.  Thus, it cannot directly improve
the verification of assertions about future performance (most
frequently a feature of credit transactions).
That is not to say that information technology cannot
improve verification in future-performance situations.  For one
thing, the example I used above is one in which information
technology dispensed with the need for future performance
entirely.28  More generally, institutions that improve the investor’s
ability to assess the present facts relevant to the future per-
formance – credit scoring and the pooling discussed below, for
example – plainly improve the investor’s ability to verify the
target’s assertion of future performance.  But the information
technology cannot speak directly to the future performance (as it
                                                                
28 The genius of the debit-card example is that it uses technology to
convert the future performance implicit in the paper-based processing of the
check transaction to contemporaneous performance based on electronic proc-
essing.  That is not feasible in lending transactions, because deferred perform-
ance is the central purpose of the transaction, not simply an unfortunate side
effect of ineffective clearance institutions.
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can to the historical-fact issues discussed above) and thus must
leave the information problem at least partially in place.
The second limitation is less definitive, a perception that
information technology is likely to permit direct verification only
in transactions involving relatively simple and objective
information: is the check good or bad?  If the information is
more complicated or subjective (Is this company a good invest-
ment? Is this the best mountain-bike on the market for my
needs?) information technology is less likely to result in direct
verification of the information because the costs to the individual
user of verifying the information are likely to remain higher than
the value of the information.  That does not mean that the
information cannot be verified.  It only means that the merchant
will rely on a third party that specializes in assessing the point in
question, most commonly one of the so-called “information
merchants” that I discuss below.  Thus, even in an information-
technology age there is good reason to believe that information
users will continue to rely on some institution for verifying all but
the simplest information.  The question, then, is what those
institutions will be, the topic of Part II of this essay.
II.  INDIRECT EFFECTS: ENHANCING VERIFICATION INSTITUTIONS
Although the range within which information technology
can foster direct verification of information by the parties to
financing transactions is relatively limited, the range within which
it can lower the costs of the information asymmetry is quite
broad.  That is because the general decrease in the cost of
information should enhance the functioning of many types of
verification institutions.  Using those enhanced institutions, the
net costs of the asymmetry (that is, the costs of any ineradicable
information asymmetry plus the costs of the institutions used to
manage it) can be reduced farther than they could through the
use of less sophisticated institutions.  This part of the essay
discusses three separate areas in which those developments
have appeared already: reputational verification; intermediation
by pooling; and the professional collection and sale of
information.  In each area, I argue, those developments presage
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an enhancement in the importance of non-legal sanctions and
other privately arranged institutions, with a corresponding
stagnation or decrease in the importance of legal and other
publicly devised institutions.
A.  Reputational Verification Systems
The most general effect of information technology arises
ineluctably from the decreased cost of collecting and analyzing
information: a general enhancement of the effectiveness of
reputational verification, the simplest information-based sanc-
tion.29  It is easy to see several reasons why reputational
verification should work better as information becomes less
costly.30  For one thing, enhanced information flows make it
much easier for a lender to be sure that it has obtained (and can
count on continuing to obtain) reliable information about
reputation-relevant events.31  Similarly, by lowering the costs of
analyzing information, information technology makes it easier for
the lender to assess the significance of the information that it
has obtained.  That effect plays out in several ways.  For exam-
ple, it is easier for the lender to match particular pieces of
information with particular transactions.  Also, it is easier for the
lender to develop reliable methods of quantifying less objective
events, which makes it easier for a lender to rely on such events
in assessing the reputation of a borrower or potential borrower.32
Those effects are crystallized in the rise of computerized
systems for routinely collecting and evaluating publicly available
                                                                
29 For a general discussion of the mechanics of reputational verification,
see Mann, Verification Institutions, supra note 1, at 2252-57.
30 For a similar perspective focused on the venture-capital industry, see
D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. SMALL
& EMERGING BUS. L. 133, 156-70 (1998).
31 See Mann, Verification Institutions, supra note 1, at 2256 (explaining
why reputational sanctioning works better when it is easier for lenders to obtain
information about their borrowers).
32 See Mann, Verification Institutions, supra note 1, at 2256-57
(discussing the importance to a system of reputational verification of objective
indicators of misconduct by the borrower).
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information about potential borrowers.33  Some of the effects are
simple information-sharing arrangements.  Major telephone
companies, for example, have an information clearinghouse that
makes it easier to identify consumers who fail to pay their
telephone bills in a timely manner.34  With more complexity,
lenders in an increasingly broad range of transactions use
credit-scoring systems to enhance their underwriting practices.
Those systems rapidly (in a matter of minutes) collect and
evaluate information about a particular borrower, reducing the
information to a single number that provides a statistically valid
prediction regarding the likelihood that the borrower will default if
the proposed loan is granted.35  Indeed, companies now are
aiming for something even more valuable, models that can
predict which customers are most likely to file for bankruptcy!36
Lenders also are using similar technology to evaluate
existing borrowers.  In that context, the early-warning system
periodically collects publicly available information, sorts through
it for information relevant to the lender’s portfolio, and then alerts
individual officers about warning signs relevant to a particular
loan.37  Those systems make reputational enforcement much
more effective than it could have been just a few years ago,
                                                                
33 For a lucid and impressively prophetic discussion of the effects of
improved information flows on investors, see Donald C. Langevoort, Information
Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV . L. REV. 747,
757-59 (1985).
34 See Nicole Jacoby, Who Watches Your Credit?: Agencies You’ve
Never Heard of Are Keeping Tabs on Your Spending Habits (visited June 3, 1999)
<http://cnnfn.com/quickenonfn/life/9906/02/q_creditaccess>
35 See Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business
Lending, 86 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1, 30-34 (1997) [hereinafter Mann, Small-Business
Lending] (discussing the mechanics of credit-scoring and its importance to small-
business lending).
36 See Lisa Fickensher, Eyes on Credit: Software To Predict
Bankruptcies in Demand, AM. BANKER, Mar. 4, 1999, at 9, available at 1999 WL
6033085.
37 See Mann, Small-Business Lending, supra note 35, at 34-36
(discussing those systems).
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because they accelerate the point at which negative information
reaches the responsible officer of the lender.38
The obvious conclusion to draw from the foregoing is that
reputation will become a more widespread verification device
than it has been in the past.  To offer just one possible
significant result, consider the use of reputation in the public
credit markets.  I have argued that investors in publicly issued
debt obligations rely heavily on the reputation of the issuer, and
that one of the key determinants of the ability of an entity to sell
such obligations at a reasonable price (a price that produces
savings on interest costs that exceed the higher transaction
costs of the public debt issuance) is the issuer’s ability to offer a
significant reputational bond.39  Because only the largest
companies return to the markets with sufficient frequency for
their reputational bonds to be adequate to support that kind of
debt, that generally limits the public debt markets to a small
portion of the economy, only the very largest companies.40
The decreasing cost of information and the corollary
increasing effectiveness of reputational sanctions do suggest,
however, that the lower limit on reputational enforcement should
fall significantly, permitting marginally smaller firms to begin to
issue public debt.  Moreover, any such shift would be
                                                                
38 The efficacy of those systems is evident from the persistent trend in
the consumer credit-card markets towards ever riskier groups of borrowers.  As
those systems increase in sophistication, they allow their users to make ever
more reliable judgments about the relative creditworthiness of quite risky bor-
rowers.  See, e.g., Lisa Fickensher, Specialty Issuers Buffer Big Banks Easing
into Subprime Card Market, AM. BANKER, June 3, 1999, at 1, 12 (describing the
process by which “[c]ustomers once considered eligible only for secured cards
are now being offered standard credit cards”).  As one banker explained, credit
scoring allows the bank “to distinguish between highly and mildly risky cus-
tomers.  There is a difference between a doctor who filed for bankruptcy and an
immigrant who has come over here to go to graduate school.”  Id. at 12 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
39 See Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110
HARV . L. REV. 625, 671-74 (1997) [hereinafter Mann, The Pattern of Secured
Credit].
40 See Mann, Verification Institutions, supra note 1, at 2254-55
(discussing the link between size of the borrower and efficacy of the reputational
bond).
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accelerated by the point made in the first part of this essay, a
decline in the costs of direct assessment of information about
the party issuing the debt.41
It is easy, however, to overstate the effects of that shift.
The most prominent arena in which that shift has started to bear
fruit is in the area of the direct public offering (commonly
referred to as a DPO).  The last few years have seen the
creation of several services allowing small businesses to issue
securities directly over the Internet without the intermediation of
any investment bank.42  Hundreds of companies have taken
advantage of that opportunity, going directly to the capital
markets without any intermediary.43  Similarly, companies are
now trying to use the Internet to solicit potentially interested
investors without issuing securities.44  Supporters of those
                                                                
41 I do not mean to suggest that the markets providing that information
are, or will become, perfect.  For criticism of some existing practices in the rat-
ings industry, see Mark R. Patterson, Coercion, Deception, and Other Demand-
Increasing Practices in Antitrust Law, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 42-48 (1997)
(analyzing allegations that Moody’s uses threats of bad ratings to force debt
issuers to purchase Moody’s ratings services).  For a more optimistic view about
the competitive state of the ratings agencies, see Richard Cantor & Frank
Packer, Differences of Opinion and Selection Bias in the Credit Rating Industry,
21 J. BANKING & FIN. 1395, 1396-1400, 1405-16 (1997) (concluding that issuers
do not use differences among agency rating scales to mislead investors).
42 See Stephen J. Choi, Gatekeepers and the Internet: Rethinking the
Regulation of Small Business Capital Formation, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L.
27, 37 (1998); Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business
Capital Barrier, 2 J. SMALL &  EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 75-77 (1998); Donald C.
Langevoort, Angels on the Internet: The Elusive Promise of “Technological
Disintermediation”for Unregistered Offerings of Securities, 2 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 11-12 (1998); Note, Taming the Frontier?: An Evaluation of
the SEC’s Regulation of Internet Securities Trading Systems, 1 COL.  BUS. L.
REV. 165, 167 [hereinafter Note, Taming the Frontier] (1999) (discussing such
sites).  Those systems follow in the footsteps of a number of pre-Internet
systems (most prominently ACE-Net) that also tried to produce disintermediated
investments in small businesses.  For a good summary of those earlier systems,
see Langevoort, supra, at 7-9.
43 See Elizabeth Brandon-Brown, Direct Public Offering – A Viable
Financing Option for Small Businesses (visited Oct. 21, 1997) http://www.direct-
stock-market.com/DSMExt…asesList/5B11EEB53E393D1882564D4006094B2
(reporting 358 offerings by 185 companies in 1996).
44 See Langevoort, supra  note 42, at 9-10.
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systems herald an age of direct transactions between the
investors and portfolio companies, without the use of any
intermediaries.45
At least to date, however, the results of those direct stock
markets have been disappointing to their supporters.  Generally,
they have attracted a relatively small number of issuers, who
have succeeded in raising only the most modest sums of
money.46  But the analysis above offers a simple explanation for
the disappointing results those markets have faced to date.  As I
have emphasized above, information technology does not
magically produce a world of perfect information.  Rather, it
produces incremental (albeit large) reductions in the cost of
information, reductions that incrementally enhance the efficacy
of reputational sanctions.  But those incremental enhancements
are least likely to be effective in the area of initial public offer-
ings by extremely small enterprises, because those companies
often have no track record to support an existing reputation and
insufficient size to support a large reputational bond without such
                                                                
45 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the
Internet on Modern Securities Regulation, 52 BUS. LAWYER 1185, 1200 n.21
(1997) (listing such statements); see also What Is a DPO?,
www.dpocentral.com/Education/DPOs/whatis.htm (“The Internet offers a
tremendous new medium for DPOs … [T]he Internet [is] the perfect tool for
offering stock to the public.”); What Are the Advantages of a Direct Public Offer-
ing? www.dfdpo.com/aboutdpos.htm (“DPO’s offer a competitive advantage in the
marketplace by strengthening customer loyalty.”); The New Direction in Capital
Markets www.dsm.com/about (“[DPOs through] DSM empowe[r] investors, giving
them the ability to communicate directly with company principals, view Virtual
Roadshows, and evaluate company information.”).  For an early guarded
statement to that effect, see Langevoort, supra note 33, at 764.
46 See Brandon-Brown, supra note 43 (reporting that only 30% of 1996
direct offerings succeeded, while about 95% of stock-exchange and NASDAQ
IPO’s succeeded); Fisch, supra note 42, at 79; Note, Taming the Frontier, supra
note 42, at 167; James Kim, Net Breathes New Life into Old Concept: Direct
Public Offerings Let Investors Act Like Venture Capitalists, USA TODAY, July 20,
1999, at 01B (reporting that 321 companies filed for direct public offerings in
1998, but that analysts expected only a third to successfully complete their offer-
ings); Jennifer Mann, Specialists Offer Advice on How To Raise Money, THE
JOURNAL RECORD, July 6, 1999, available at 1999 WL 9846989 (reporting that
direct public offerings to date have raised only $1 billion, from 800 successful
offerings, while angel investors fund about $20 billion each year).
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a record.47  Rather, those are precisely the types of companies
likely to benefit most from the ability to use the reputational bond
of a third party.48  Thus, those planning on lending to (or
investing in) such companies are likely to retain considerable
skepticism about the information problems associated with those
companies, even in a world of improved information
technology.49
The basic problem is that the direct stock markets have
set themselves too hard a task.  Advances in information tech-
nology are likely to lower the size hurdle for posting significant
reputational bonds, so that the next tier of smaller companies 
                                                                
47 See Bernard S. Black, Information Asymmetry, the Internet, and
Securities Offerings, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 91, 92-95 (1998); Fisch,
supra note 42, at 78; Langevoort, supra  note 42, at 14-15.  To get a sense for the
tiny size of the offerings, the statistics reported in Mann, supra note 46, suggest
an average size for a successful offering of only $1.25 million.  41 conventional
initial public offerings in August of 1999 raised about $3.7 billion, for an average
offering size of about $90 million.  See
www.marketdata.nasdaq.com/asp/mr3.asp (visited Oct. 6, 1999).
48 See Mann, Verification Institutions, at 2269-71 (discussing reputational
intermediation in the issuance of securities).
49 There are, of course, other difficulties in disintermediated investments
in those companies.  One is the obvious potential for fraud, which is aggravated
by the influx of unsophisticated Internet day-traders.  See Brian E. Taptich,
Microbes Invade the Net, RED HERRING, Nov. 1999, at 274 (reporting that
microcap-stock scams have quadrupled in the last five years; discussing various
schemes for fraud and manipulation); Coffee, supra note 45, at 1222-27; Choi,
supra note 42, at 37-38; Fisch, supra note 42, at 80-83.  On the other side of the
coin is the problem that many of the companies in question would benefit both
from sophisticated guidance in the listing process and also from careful
monitoring.  Thus, as Don Langevoort reasons persuasively, the promise of the
Internet for those companies is much more likely to be a promise of an easier
time locating angel and venture-capitalist type investors than a promise of a
prompt public offering. Langevoort, supra  note 42, at 16-19; see Fisch, supra
note 42, at 84-88 (suggesting that small businesses using disintermediated fund-
raising channels would suffer from the lack of advice that they would get if they
used conventional intermediated channels); Ronald J. Gilson, Understanding the
Choice Between Public and Private Equity Financing of Early Stage Companies:
A Comment on Barry and Turki, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 123, 126-29
(1998) (suggesting that the monitoring and governance structure of venture capital
companies explains the greater returns obtained by development-stage
companies that have venture-capital support, as compared to those that obtain
equity from public offerings).
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those just beneath the smallest traditional public issuers 
should develop reputations sufficient to support the issuance of
underwritten public securities, bolstered by the traditional repu-
tational intermediation provided by investment banks to those
issuers.50  Similarly, but at a larger level, the same factors
eventually should allow relatively smaller issuers to issue public
securities directly without the assistance of that intermediation.
But that provides little help to the issuers that currently
appear on the direct stock markets.  Those markets currently
are populated by so-called “micro-cap” investments, very small
companies seeking very small amounts of money.51  Their initial
efforts did not succeed well because they were far smaller than
the smallest companies that typically issue intermediated
securities, to say nothing of their minuscule size compared to
those companies readily able to issue disintermediated securi-
ties.  Thus, where others view the limited success as proof that
information technology will bring few changes to the institutional
arrangements of public fund-raising, I view the more recent
evidence of an upward trend in direct public offerings52 as
surprisingly positive given the obstacles to those offerings
discussed above.53
The harder question – for which I have no persuasive
answer – is why so few large companies have taken advantage
of those institutions to issue disintermediated securities.  My
analysis suggests that those institutions should work quite well
for companies large enough to dispense with intermediation,
especially in high-tech markets likely to attract computer-literate
                                                                
50 It is difficult to evaluate that question empirically, because numerous
other factors are likely to affect the size of initial public offerings, the most
prominent being the supply of money into the market for such offerings and the
general level of optimism in the market at the time in question.
51 Note, Taming the Frontier, supra note 42, at 167 & n.11.  For a list of
those companies see Direct Public Offerings Via the Internet (visited June 17,
1999) <http://www.ipodata.com/dpo.html>.
52 See James Kim, Net Breathes Life into Old Concept, USA TODAY, July
20, 1999, at B1 (presenting recent data from www.dsm.com, indicating 321 direct
public offerings in 1998).
53 See supra note 49.
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investors.  Although I cannot yet explain that phenomenon, my
general impression is that it arises from a combination of three
factors.  First, a variety of SEC-imposed rules limit the
usefulness of the Internet-based markets by making it difficult to
use those markets to raise large sums of money.54  Second,
successful companies may be reluctant to expose themselves to
the possible adverse reputational effects of adopting novel meth-
ods of financing.  Why take a risk on market reaction to a novel
financing method if current financing is not a problem?55  If the
incremental cost advantages are small,56 even a slight adverse
reputational effect might be enough to deter a shift in financing
method in the short run. Third, because fewer investors
purchase in the direct markets than in the traditional markets, it
will continue for some time to be difficult for large issuers to
obtain financing at rates as low as the rates that they can obtain
in the more populated conventional public debt markets.
                                                                
54 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 45, at 1210-13 (analyzing how the SEC
should respond to direct stock offerings); Fisch, supra note 42, at 64-65
(explaining the traditional SEC limitations on direct offerings).
55 As Jill Fisch explains:
Investors may also view the absence of outside expert involvement in
Internet offerings as a negative signal.  Investors may reasonably perceive that an
issuer who bypasses the traditional underwriter route does not meet the quality
standards of the investment banking community.  After all, if an issuer can raise
more money through a traditional IPO, why would a company that qualifies to do
an IPO choose a DPO instead?
Fisch, supra note 42, at 79; see Coffee, supra note 45, at 1204
(suggesting that such an issue might be “a desperate gamble by an issuer with
no other alternatives”).
56 On that point, I do not think it is a coincidence that one of the main
forces driving direct public offerings is a perception that the fees charged by
investment bankers are excessive.  See Gregory M. Kratofil, Jr., Internet Can
Serve Your Company’s Capital Needs, K.C.  STAR, June 29, 1999, at D12 (report-
ing costs of traditional intermediated offering as 15% while costs of a direct
disintermediated offering are only 6%); Mann, supra note 46 (reporting that direct
public offerings are relatively cheap, because “using underwriters also adds 7
percent to 10 percent to the cost of an offering”); More Companies Than Ever Do
Their Own IPOs, BUSINESS WIRE, Apr. 2, 1999 (available on Westlaw) (reporting
that the cost of a traditional IPO usually is about 15% of the total amount raised,
compared to 3% on a typical $1 million direct public offering); What Are the
Advantages of a Direct Public Offering?, supra note 45 (“Direct public offerings
are considerably less expensive than traditional underwritten offerings.”).
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In my view, however, none of those obstacles can
withstand for long the basic cost advantage of dis-intermediating
a substantial portion of the transactions.  First, the SEC has
shown every intention of facilitating Internet transactions in a
safe way, so it seems unlikely that it will adopt a regulatory
posture that makes those transactions permanently difficult.57
Second, the novelty of the Internet as a financing method should
dissipate over time, and already is counterbalanced by the
increasing lure of the “.com” phenomenon, under which
anything remotely associated with the Internet seems to carry an
almost mystical value to investors.58  Finally, the last few years
have seen a huge increase in the number of investors that
populate the Internet markets, which at this point seems quite
adequate to provide sufficient capital for even the largest
issuers.59  Thus, although the process has gone slowly to date, I
continue to believe that the coming years will witness a rapid
increase in disintermediated issuances and in intermediated
public issuances by ever smaller companies.  The deeper point
                                                                
57 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 45, at 1215-16 (discussing the SEC’s
response to Wit-Trade’s unauthorized bulletin-board trading system); Fisch,
supra note 42, at 69-75 (discussing the SEC’s beneficent attitude to Internet
securities trading).  That is not to say that the SEC is sanguine about the Internet
as a securities market.  On the contrary, the SEC seems quite alert to the
possibility – indeed, the reality – that Internet transactions will lead to fraud and
sharp dealing to the detriment of investors.  See Fisch, supra note 42, at 81-82
(discussing SEC responses to Internet-related securities fraud); SEC Charges 44
with Internet Securities Fraud (Reuters 10-28-98) (reporting SEC prosecutions for
Internet securities fraud); Gretchen Morgenson, Online, Day Trading Subject of
Federal Probe, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 30, 1999, at C5 (reporting SEC
probe of adherence of online brokerages to regulations regarding short sales);
Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Levitt Warns Traders of Online Excesses, WASH.  POST,
May 5, 1999, at E03 (reporting broad SEC investigation of disclosure compliance
by online trading firms).
58 See, e.g., Anthony B. Perkins, Our Advice to Internet Company
Investors: Sell Now!, RED HERRING, Sept. 1999, at 13-14 (discussing stunning
valuations of Internet-related companies; reporting a list of 133 “Bubble” stocks
with a valuation of $410 billion based on combined sales of $15.2 billion and
losses of $3 billion by a group of companies only 17 percent of which have yet
shown profits).
59 See, e.g., A Play for the Big League, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 9, 1999,
1999 WL 12070147 (discussing comments by Alan Greenspan and Bill Gates
about the “irrational exuberance” and “gold rush” mentality of investors rushing to
Internet-related investments).
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for this essay, though, is the motive force behind that trend, the
increased effectiveness of the non-legal reputational sanction.
B.  Intermediation by Pooling
The previous section analyzed how advances in
information technology enhance the ability of a first-party veri-
fication system – the ability of the borrower to use a reputational
bond to mitigate information problems in its financing
transactions.  Information technology also has fostered the
growth of securitized transactions, in which a large group of
information-problematic transactions can be verified through the
intervention of an intermediary that pools the transactions and
sells small interests in the pool as a whole.  The key to that
process from my perspective is the way in which information
technology has made it feasible for the intermediaries that pool
the transactions to provide en-masse assessments of
transactions for which the most cost-effective practice formerly
was case-by-case lender-by-lender examination.
To understand the magnitude of the advance in
information verification, consider the information problem pre-
sented by the individual home-mortgage transaction.60  The key
piece of information in that transaction is the likelihood that the
borrower will repay the loan as agreed.  The relatively low credit
standing of the average home-mortgage borrower makes it
difficult for the borrower to use its reputation or anything else to
verify that assertion.61  Accordingly, the potential investor in
such an obligation must resort to some other device for
assessing the reliability of that assertion.  As it happens, a thor-
ough assessment of the assertion involves a considerable body
of information, ranging from objective items like the income and
                                                                
60 I use that example because (as explained below) that is the context in
which this type of pooling securitization first succeeded.  See infra note 71 and
accompanying text (discussing the early history of home-mortgage
securitization).
61 I do not mean to suggest that home-mortgage borrowers are less
creditworthy than other individuals, only that they generally are less creditworthy
than the large corporations that typically borrow in the public debt markets in
which mortgage-backed securities now are bought and sold.
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outstanding debt of the borrower, to the value of the home in
question, to more subjective items such as the possibility of
undesirable future events like a default or prepayment by the
borrower.
The market for such obligations traditionally operated on a
case-by-case basis, with each lender evaluating each trans-
action and advancing funds at a price (interest rate) that
reflected the lender’s assessment of all of the relevant
information regarding the likelihood of repayment.  That case-
by-case process was relatively expensive both because it was
time-intensive and because the idiosyncrasy of the resulting
obligations made them relatively illiquid.62
Developments in information technology, however, have
completely transformed that market.  In the current economy,
home-mortgages notes are issued through a sophisticated set of
institutions that dramatically lower the transaction costs of
assessing information and produce highly standardized obli-
gations of great liquidity.  The result is a significantly more
efficient market for investment in home mortgages, in the sense
that the cost of borrowing is significantly lower than it otherwise
would be63 and also, perhaps more significantly, in the sense
that the market now includes a wide range of different
submarkets with different rates and terms for borrowers of
differing credit quality.64
                                                                
62 See Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit
Systems, 44 UCLA L. REV. 951, 969 (1997) [hereinafter Mann, Searching for
Negotiability] (describing transactions in traditional home-mortgage markets).
63 It does not seem possible to quantify the degree of interest-rate
reduction, but the figures certainly are substantial.  See, e.g., Frank Byrt, Un-
derwriting Software Turning Small Lenders into Bigger Competitors, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 26, 1998, at 5 (reporting Fannie Mae estimate that adoption of automated
underwriting would save borrowers $100 million per year in interest payments);
Karen Talley, Citi Sees Itself Securitizing Corporate Debt Worldwide, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 16, 1998, at 17 (reporting that Citicorp’s corporate securitizations
usually bear interest rates about 50 basis points cheaper than conventional long-
term financing).
64 For a general discussion of the newly developing sectors of the home-
mortgage financing market, see CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS & JOSEPH R. MASON, HIGH
LOAN-TO-VALUE MORTGAGE LENDING: PROBLEM OR CURE? 15-34 (1999).
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The first advance comes at the point of issuance, where
the credit-scoring systems discussed above generate relatively
accurate predictions of the risk of default based on a relatively
small number of data points.65  Thus, the costs of collecting
information have shrunk considerably, while the accuracy of the
resulting assessment has remained more or less the same (with
your opinion on the relative accuracy depending on your relative
faith in the skill of experienced loan officers versus the skill of
sophisticated computer programs).66
The more important piece of the picture, however, is what
happens to the obligation once it has been issued.  The changes
in the process of issuance have resulted in a set of standardized
obligations with respect to which a set of standardized data
points has been collected.67  Information technology works in
several different ways to make it practicable for an intermediary
to collect a large number of those obligations, pool them, and
issue securities representing very small shares of the pool of
obligations.68  First and most obviously, it would not be
practicable without relatively advanced information technology
for the intermediary to perform the ministerial tasks of dividing
                                                                
65 See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing the advent of
credit-scoring systems).  The dependence of securitization on credit-scoring is
suggested by the link between the recent spread of small-business credit-scoring
software to the rise of small-business loan securitization.  See Sara Nathan,
Scoring, Underwriting Software Being Linked to Spur Securitization, AM. BANKER,
Nov. 17, 1997, at 10.
66 Another advantage of that software is that it considerably diminishes
the advantage of large issuers by lowering the entry barriers to the industry.  The
enhanced competition also should work to bring down the costs of lending in the
area.  See Byrt, supra note 63, at 5 (reporting Fannie Mae estimate that the
spread of automated underwriting would lower closing costs by $2 billion a year
and interest payments by $100 million a year).
67 The homogenization of the obligations has been accomplished by the
almost universal use of a single standard form home mortgage.  Information
technology had nothing to do with that process, which occurred simply because
the standardization makes the pooling process much simpler.
68 See Ann M. Burkhart, Lenders and Land, 64 MO. L. REV. 249, 279-80
(1999) (“Technology … has facilitated the rapid sale of loans from their originators
to the secondary market.”).  For a thorough and informed summary of the
process, see Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 1061, 1066-77 (1996).
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the pool of obligations into huge numbers of separate shares,
monitoring the sums due to the holders of the separate shares,
and delivering payments to those holders.  Moreover, the ability
to perform computerized analyses of large pools of obligations
allows the intermediary to rely on the law of large numbers to
minimize the significance of any deviations from expected
performance, thus limiting the costs of inaccurate information.69
Finally, because of the liquidity of those small standardized
shares, investors accept a much lower return on those shares
than they would on individual underlying mortgages of a similar
face value.70
And the effectiveness of that process is not purely
hypothetical.  Since its introduction in the early 1970’s by the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, that process has
spread to a number of related quasi-governmental agencies (the
Federal National Mortgage Association and the Governmental
National Mortgage Association) and more recently to several
large private financial institutions.71  It now completely dominates
the home-mortgage industry, being used to finance more than
three-quarters of all new home mortgages issued in this
country.72
                                                                
69 See CALOMIRIS & MASON, supra note 64, at 36 (explaining that pooling
of loans increases the predictability of average loan performance).
70 For a basic discussion of the benefits of liquidity in this context, see
MANN, supra note 17, at 469-70.
71 See 2 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN,  REAL ESTATE FINANCE
LAW § 11.3, at 70-78 (3d ed. 1993) (Practitioner Treatise Series) (discussing the
growth of the market for mortgage-backed securities); Michael H. Schill, The
Impact of the Capital Markets on Real Estate Law and Practice, 32 JOHN
MARSHALL L. REV. 269, 270-76 (1999) (same); Burkhart, supra note 68, at 275-76
(discussing the rise of private issuances since the mid-1980s).
72 See Burkhart, supra note 68, at 274-77 (“By the mid-1990s, more than
three-quarters of the new single family residential mortgages were being secu-
ritized.”); Schill, supra note 71, at 271 (presenting recent statistics).  As of
December 1998, Federal Reserve statistics indicated that securitized mortgage
pools held about 53% of the total outstanding mortgage debt on one- to four-
family residences in this country.  Mortgage Debt Outstanding, 84 FED. RESERVE
BULL. A35 tbl. 1.54 (Dec. 1998) ($2,232,659,000 of a total of $4,195,738,000).
March 30, 2000 Draft INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 25
And that percentage should continue to rise as the
technology matures sufficiently to function effectively for less
reliable transactions (the so-called “subprime” market).73  The
system has the potential to be unusually valuable in that area
because of the relatively higher variability of return associated
with loans of greater risk.  The problem risky loans present to
investors is not just that the likelihood of nonpayment is higher
(something for which a higher interest rate could compensate),
but that the lender’s estimate of the likelihood of nonpayment on
any given loan is less likely to be accurate.  Pooling provides a
substantial response to that difficulty by allowing each
lender/investor to obtain a share in a pool of loans, for which a
large percentage deviation from the anticipated rate of default is
much less likely than it would be for any single loan in the pool.74
A central part of the pooling system is the willingness of
the intermediary to make representations about the obligations
contained in the pool that backs the securities.  The investors do
not themselves examine the underlying obligations in any
substantial way.  Instead, they rely on assertions by the inter-
mediary as to the general quality, geographical diversity, and
                                                                
73 See, e.g., Heather Timmons, Pioneer of High LTVs Is Still the One To
Watch, AM. BANKER, Nov. 19, 1997, at 12 (discussing the nascent use of securiti-
zation of home mortgages issued in amounts that exceed the value of the home);
Karen Talley, Small Banks Stepping up High-LTV Securitizations, AM.  BANKER,
Jan. 20, 1998, at 7 (discussing the increasing success of securitization by small
banks of high-LTV home mortgages).  The decline in the quality of loans being
securitized is epitomized by the SEC’s recent decision to permit securitization of
packages of loans with up to twenty percent of the loans delinquent at the time
the securities are issued.  See Aaron Elstein, SEC Shifts To Allow 20%
Delinquencies in Asset-Backeds, AM. BANKER, Oct. 21, 1997, at 1, 26; see also
Karen Talley, To Russia with Securitization: Fannie Is Helping Moscow Establish
a ‘Natasha Mae’, AM. BANKER, Apr. 4, 1997, at 10 (discussing plans to securitize
Russian loans despite the “steep” economic problems in Russia).  Although that
market has experienced considerable dislocation as it has grown, see, e.g.,
Heather Timmons, Subprime Lender Files for Ch. 11 Reorganization, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 5, 1998, at 16 (discussing those problems), current conditions
suggest that it will grow significantly in the immediate future.  See Heather
Timmons, High-LTV Securities Coming Back, with New Buyers, AM.  BANKER,
Apr. 27, 1999, at 9.
74 See Hill, supra note 68, at 1074-75.
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aggregate payment terms of the entire pool of obligations.75  The
reliability of those assertions, in turn, is verified by two separate
institutions: the intermediary’s reputational bond and a limited
form of guaranty.
The most obvious is the guaranty; most intermediaries that
package such securities offer some guaranty of performance on
the securities.76  Although a law-centered view of the process
might view that guaranty as much more important to the system
than the informal reputational sanction, I am convinced that the
customary limitations on the guaranty leave considerable work to
be done by the reputational sanction.  The most direct evidence
to support my view is the considerable disclosures the
intermediaries provide regarding the underlying obligations.77  If
the intermediary’s guaranty made payment adequately certain,
then the investor would have no need for that information; it
would care only about the payment terms of the security and the
reliability of the guarantor.
More generally, it is easy to see four concerns about the
securities that the guaranty does not assuage.  First, the guar-
anties are not costless to enforce; it is cheaper for an investor to
receive a payment in the ordinary course of business than to
coerce payment through exercising its rights on a guaranty.78
Second, payment is not sure even under a guaranty, because of
the possibility that the intermediary will fail (a possibility that
                                                                
75 See, e.g., KENNETH G. LORE, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES:
DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET 4-105 to –106, -
111 to -114 (1996) (describing customary disclosures of information related to
pooled mortgages).
76 See 2 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 71, at 72-75 (discussing
guaranties of mortgage-backed securities by the quasi-governmental entities that
issue them).
77 See supra note 75.
78 See Mann, Verification Institutions, supra note 1, at 2260 (discussing
the difficulties of relying on legal action as a method of verifying the truth of
assertions made by guarantors).
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increases as a larger group of purely private institutions begin to
issue such securities).79
Third, the terms of the guaranties typically do not require
timely compliance with all payments due under the securities;
thus, even if the guarantor promptly complies with its obligations,
the investor may suffer some loss from deferred payment.80
And that is not a mere technicality; knowledgeable observers
believe that the market discounts the prices of the securities that
include such provisions to account for that problem.81
Finally, in most cases the guaranties do not protect the
investor from the risk of prepayment.  The “pass-through”
structure commonly used for those securities leaves investors
exposed to a relatively unattractive risk of prepayment.  As
homeowners make payments on the underlying mortgages, the
payments are pooled, allocated, and passed through to the
securities holders.  Thus, when individual homeowners repay
their mortgages before their maturity dates (typically upon a sale
of the home or refinancing of the mortgage), holders of the
securities receive payments on their securities sooner than the
contractually required dates82; because prepayments tend to
                                                                
79 See sources cited supra note 71 (discussing privately issued
securitized home-mortgage obligations).  It also is worth noting that there is
some credit risk even among the government-issued securities, because Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac securities (unlike Ginnie Mae securities) are not backed
formally by the full faith and credit of the federal government.  See 2 NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 71, at 75; MARCIA STIGUM, THE MONEY MARKET 63-64 (3d ed.
1990).  The significance of the separate credit strength of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac is evident from the close oversight Congress gives to the financial
position of those entities.  See 2 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 71, at 73.
80 See STIGUM, supra note 79, at 63-64.
81 See STIGUM, supra note 79, at 64.
82 See STIGUM, supra note 79, at 64 (explaining the prepayment risk
inherent in a pass-through securities structure).  As Stigum explains, the likeli-
hood of prepayment gives the typical 30-year home mortgage an expected life in
normal interest-rate environments of only 12 years.  Volatility in interest rates,
however, can alter that period significantly. See STIGUM, supra note 79, at 64.
Interestingly, the subprime market mitigates that problem by imposing
prepayment fees on borrowers in their portfolios.  See Heather Timmons, Sub-
prime Lenders Use Prepayment Fees To Protect Their Portfolios, AM.  BANKER,
Jan. 9, 1998, at 8.  Mainstream lenders resort to that device relatively rarely,
March 30, 2000 Draft INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 28
come at times of low market interest rates, prepayments that
come sooner than expected are costly to the investor.83  Again,
that is not a purely theoretical problem; for example, one series
of GNMA securities was prepaid in its entirety after only two
years because of underlying home-loan prepayments sparked
by falling interest rates in the 1980’s.84
From my perspective, the reason that the unreliability of
the guaranty does not seriously trouble investors in home-
mortgage securities is that other information-based mechanisms
are relieving their uncertainty, the most important of which is the
reputation of the intermediary.  The intermediaries function in a
market ideally suited for reputational verification.  They are large
entities that return frequently to the market with new issues of
securities.  Thus, their reputations are quite valuable, probably
essential to their continued existence.  Furthermore, it is easy to
assess their reputations at any time.  Events that should
undermine their reputations are objectively easy to identify 
defaults on securities that they have issued, defaults on their
guaranties, or excessive prepayments on securities that they
have issued  and the information regarding those events is
rapidly and easily accessible to everybody involved in the
industry.85  It should come as no surprise, then, that industry
periodicals publish statistics evaluating the quality of the under-
                                                                                                                                                             
because it generally would drive off borrowers at a rate unjustified by the savings
to the lender.  For examples, see R. MALLOY & J. SMITH, REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS 820 (1998) (stating that lenders commonly trade 0.25% per year in
annual interest-rate reductions for a waiver of the right to prepay); Jim Gallagher,
Mortgage Gymnastics Can Keep Rate Low, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, E1 (Aug. 8,
1999) (reporting a bank offering a 0.38% to 0.58% discount on annual interest
rates if borrowers accepted a two-percent prepayment penalty for the first three
years of the mortgage).
83 The connection between low interest rates and refinancing is oft noted,
see, e.g., 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 71, § 6.1, at 482; Stigum, supra note
79, at 64, but low interest rates also should spur prepayment caused by sales,
because of the increased purchasing power potential home purchasers acquire
when interest rates fall.
84 See STIGUM, supra note 79, at 64.
85 See Mann, Verification Institutions, supra note 1, at 2254-57
(identifying those factors as crucial to the success of reputational sanctioning).
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writing of the various issuers in the market.86  Hence, it is easy
to see why investors prudently would rely on the assertions of
the pooling intermediaries, even as to matters for which the
intermediaries had not accepted any formal legal liability.87
The power of that technology is illustrated not only by its
spread into the sub-prime market for home mortgages, but also
by its steady spread into completely different types of obli-
gations, the most interesting of which has been credit-card
receivables.88  The most striking thing about those transactions
is that the average credit-card receivable is one of the least
liquid obligations imaginable.  Its quality depends upon the
creditworthiness of the cardholder and the quality of the goods
or services provided in the underlying sales transaction out of
which the receivable arose.89  Yet, pooling arrangements mod-
eled on the mortgage-backed securities described above have
succeeded in providing low-cost financing for literally hundreds
of billions of dollars of securitized credit-card receivables.90  As
                                                                
86 See, e.g., Joshua Brockman, Moody’s Says Credit Risk Varies Among
Issuers of Securitized Loan Pools, AM. BANKER, Sept. 25, 1998, at 6 (reporting
varying assessments of the credit quality of 11 prominent issuers of asset-
backed securities).
87 One prominent executive explained: “[T]he banking company knows
that its name is on the deal, and that blow-ups will tarnish its reputation [even if
all investors are repaid in full].  … I wouldn’t want to have to explain to investors I
sold a deal that didn’t work.”  Talley, supra note 63, at 17.
88 See CALOMIRIS & MASON, supra note 64, at 13 (discussing the relative
size of credit-card securitization and other areas other than the government-
underwritten conventional home mortgages); see also Claire A. Hill, Latin
American Securitization: The Case of the Disappearing Political Risk, 38 VA. J.
INT’L L. 293, 304-11 (1998) (discussing the rise of “future-flows” securitization in
Latin America, transactions which cover not-yet generated receivables).
89 If the goods or services were not satisfactory to the cardholder, the
cardholder has a variety of rights to withhold payment under the Truth-in-Lending
Act.  See MANN, supra note 17, at 116-21, 124-25 (discussing rights under
Sections 161 and 170 of the Truth-in-Lending Act).  Perhaps just as significant,
the individual dissatisfied with the goods or services might refuse to pay even if
the Truth-in-Lending Act does not excuse payment.  That is a much less likely
scenario in the case of a home mortgage, particularly one that has been
outstanding more than a few months.
90 See Aaron Elstein, Chargeoffs Raise Specter of Early Investor
Payouts, AM.  BANKER, Feb. 18, 1997, at 1 [hereinafter Elstein, Chargeoffs]
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with the home-mortgage market, it is difficult to quantify the
overall amount of the reduced interest costs, but the rapid growth
of the market suggests that they are substantial.
Another interesting feature of the credit-card
securitizations suggests that reputation appears to be particu-
larly important to investors in that market.  Credit-card securities
typically deal with the high credit risk of the underlying
receivables91 by providing for an early repayment of the securi-
ties if the value of receivables in the pool deteriorates below a
certain trigger level.92  That mechanism does protect investors
from the risk of nonpayment, but it also leaves them exposed to a
substantial risk of prepayment, a risk that imposes its own costs
on the investors.
Given the general riskiness of credit-card receivables, it is
not surprising that on several occasions the value of the receiv-
ables in a securitized credit-card pool has fallen below the
trigger level.  In every case except one (a 1991 incident involving
a minor issuer), however, the issuer has responded promptly
and voluntarily to replenish the pool of receivables so as to
prevent an early payout.93  Thus, at least one industry observer
                                                                                                                                                             
(reporting more than $100 billion of such sales in the early 1990’s, making credit-
card securities at that time the “largest sector in the asset-backed securities
market”).
91 The receivables pooled into securities are not immune from the general
riskiness of credit-card receivables.  See Elstein, Chargeoffs, supra note 90, at 1
(discussing chargeoff rates of 4-6% in securitized credit-card pools).  As if that
risk were not enough, an increasingly common transaction securitizes future
receivables: credit-card receivables from future sales transactions.  See Hill,
supra note 88, at 300-04; Aaron Elstein, Mexican Banks Use a Guarantor To
Securitize Future Card Sales, AM. BANKER, Jan. 17, 1997, at 24.
92 See CALOMIRIS & MASON, supra note 64, at 43 (discussing
mechanisms for early payout); Elstein, Chargeoffs, supra note 90, at 1 (same);
Aaron Elstein, Investors Shrugging off Concerns over Banc One Card-Backed
Security, AM. BANKER, Jan. 29, 1997, at 24 [hereinafter Elstein, Investors Shrug-
ging] (explaining that those “securities come with self-destruct mechanisms that
automatically pay investors if the portfolio deteriorates too far”).
93 See Elstein, Chargeoffs, supra note 90, at 1 (discussing practice of
replenishment); Elstein, Investors Shrugging, supra note 92, at 24 (discussing
cases of replenishment by Mercantile Bancorp and Chase Manhattan Corp.).
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believes that an early payout would have a sufficiently bad
impact on an issuer’s reputation that issuers would prefer to
replenish pools voluntarily rather than suffer the ensuing harm to
their reputations.94
*  *  *  *  *
The story of pooling is a telling one, because it illustrates
the power of transaction design to provide opportunities for
substantial reductions in information costs.  The subject trans-
actions are, as noted above, conspicuous for their illiquidity and
for the unimpressive credit strength of the borrowers liable on
the underlying obligations.  Yet, by the device of intermediated
pooling, the market can bring into play powerful non-legal
reputational sanctions to verify information at costs that – if
market success is an informative indicator – are significantly
lower than the costs incurred under less sophisticated
arrangements.
The relation between legal sanctions and non-legal
sanctions is less direct here than it was in the prior sections of
this essay, because none of the developing institutional arrange-
ments directly alter the sanctions that the lenders use against the
defaulting borrower.  But the structures of the transaction itself –
all of the steps from the originator to the investors – depend
heavily both on sophisticated information technology and
reputational sanctions.  And it is those stages that have
produced the staggering influx of money into the fields in
question, an influx that has come despite the stagnant nature of
the formal legal institutions available to solve information
problems endemic in the underlying financing transactions.
C.  Direct Sales of Information
This part started by discussing improvements in the
simple two-party institution of reputational verification, and
continued with the quasi-intermediated institution of pooled
securitization.  It closes in this subpart, with consideration of the
                                                                
94 See Elstein, Chargeoffs, supra note 90, at 1; Elstein, Investors
Shrugging, supra note 92, at 24.
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effects of information technology on third-party verification.  On
that point, the most likely effects appear to come in the area of
information merchants: commercial enterprises that sell
information that partially or completely resolves the information
asymmetry that confronts the lender.95  As I have explained in
earlier work, third-party verification institutions face an inherent
difficulty.  If the third party inserts itself into the transaction as
an intermediary, it has a conflict of interest that undermines the
credibility of its assertions.96  In some cases that can be
overcome if the lender and the third party have some basis for
“trust,” – a phenomenon that occurs most significantly in this
country in the context of angel investing97 – but those kinds of
relationships depend on contextual factors that are difficult to
replicate on a widespread basis.98
Conversely, several basic strategic problems make it
difficult for an unbiased third party to collect the information itself
and profit by selling it to the lender.  One problem, commonly
referred to as Arrow’s information paradox, makes it difficult for
the information merchant to persuade the lender that its
information is valuable without disclosing the information.99
                                                                
95 The organization builds on a general discussion and typology of third-
party verification institutions that appears in Mann, Verification Institutions, supra
note 1, at 2257-71.
96 See Mann, Verification Institutions, supra note 1, at 2269 (discussing
that problem for reputational intermediation in the securities industry).  For
empirical evidence that the conflict is significant enough to affect market prices
and other practices, see Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner, Conflict of Interest in
the Issuance of Public Securities: Evidence from Venture Capital, 42 J.L. ECON.
1, 20-24 (1999) (presenting evidence indicating (a) a positive relation between the
amount of underpricing of initial public offerings and the relation that the
underwriter has to any preexisting venture-capital investor; and (b) that investment
banks respond to that problem by targeting their investments at less “information-
sensitive” issuers).
97 See Mann, Verification Institutions, supra note 1, at 2265.
98 For a wide-ranging discussion of the effectiveness of trust-based
institutions in the information age, see Paul S. Adler, Market, Hierarchy, and
Trust: The Knowledge Economy and the Future of Capitalism, forthcoming ORG.
SCI. (copy on file with author).
99 See Mann, Verification Institutions, supra note 1, at 2267-68
(discussing that problem).
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Another problem is the low cost of replicating and disseminating
the information: once the third party discloses the information to
the lender, it is difficult for the third party to prevent the lender
from transmitting the information rapidly to others who would not
have to pay the third party for the information.100
It seems likely, however, that advances in information
technology will allow information merchants to defeat those
problems, so that the provision of information for a fee will
become much more practicable than it has been in the past.
Because the feasibility of charging for raw information fosters a
rapid specialization in the collection and analysis of information,
it should in turn foster a considerable advance in the feasibility
of all forms of information-based sanctioning in commercial
transactions.101
As with the discussion of pooling, that discussion is not
entirely hypothetical.  On the contrary, anecdotal information
suggests that the process already is beginning.  For example, in
the consumer credit area, a wide variety of sites have developed
for the express purpose of collecting, analyzing, and selling
information likely to be useful to potential creditors.102  Similarly,
creditors whose businesses allow them to collect large amounts
of information about individual consumers are recognizing the
                                                                
100 See Mann, Verification Institutions, supra note 1, at 2267 (discussing
that problem).
101 Cf. Choi, supra note 42, at 45-46 (predicting Internet-based
certification services aiding investors in publicly traded securities).
102 Any list of such sites would be doomed to be outdated by the time
this document was printed from my computer, but a sense for the burgeoning
industry is evident from the following sources.  Nicole Jacoby, Who Watches
Your Credit? http://cnnfn.com/quickenonfn/life/9906/02/q_creditaccess/ (visited
June 3, 1999) (discussing the rise of new kinds of specialized credit agencies
such as tenant screening services, check guarantee and verification companies,
debit-credit bureaus, and telephone credit clearinghouses).  A partial list of sites
that already are up and running would include www.knowx.com,
www.informus.com, www.advsearch.com, www.people-wise.com, and my favorite
at least based on name alone, www.digdirt.com.
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value of that information and refusing to allow broad industry use
for free as they customarily have in the past.103
Although that process has not yet gone as far in the
commercial lending context, it does seem to be starting.  For
example, one site called Bestcalls.com collects information about
stock analyst conference calls with publicly traded companies
and disseminates the information to investors.104  Other services
are starting to provide information about customized portfolios in
a “streaming” format similar to the familiar Pointcast service, but
specializing in financial information.105  A more telling anecdote
came to me in an interview with an executive of a nascent
Internet initial-public-offering service.106  As explained above, my
analysis suggests that the Internet stock markets will have
difficulty in raising large sums of money without some
mechanism to satisfy investors regarding the credibility of the
issuers whose stocks they list.107  The individuals that operate
those markets recognize the investors’ desire for verification of
information about the potential investments that those markets
offer.108  Given the tiny size of most current issuers in that
market, it is not practical to rely on the classic securities-market
device of obtaining verification by intermediary investment
                                                                
103 See Lisa Fickensher, Lenders Hiding Credit Data, and Regulators
Object, AM. BANKER, July 7, 1999, at 1, 7.
104 See Megan Barnett, Startup Bestcalls.com Dials for Dollars
http://www.thestandard.com/articles/display/0,1449,3952,00.html (visited Mar.
24, 1999)  (discussing the launch of that service, which currently is free).
105 See Megan Barnett, Quote.com Mulls Merger
http://www.thestandard.com/articles/display/0,1449,2910,00.html (visited Mar.
24, 1999) (summarizing the various sites that provide financial information and
predicting that most of those sites would begin providing streaming information by
the end of 1999); Carol Power, Internet Start-Up Offering Market Data at a
Discount, AM. BANKER, Jan. 19, 1999, available at 1999 WL 6031730 (discussing
a new software product designed to facilitate the use by banks of market
information about their clients).
106 See Telephone Interview with Clay Womack, President, Direct Stock
Market, transcript at 12-13 (Nov. 12, 1997 & Jan. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Womack
Interview].
107 See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
108 See Womack Interview, supra note 106 (transcript at 12-13).
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banks.  The transactions of the micro-cap issuers that currently
populate those markets are too small to bear the large fixed costs
of a traditional investment-bank supported transaction (which is
to say, a transaction in which the quality of the investment is
verified by the investment bank’s insertion of itself into the
transaction as a reputational intermediary).109
Responding to that difficulty, one vendor decided to
persuade analysts to provide information for a fee without inter-
mediation.  Thus, investment banks do not obtain a share of the
offering that they are in a position to resell to their customers.
Instead, analysts could examine information related to the issuer
and post a report at a button on the issuer’s home page at Direct
Stock Market.  For a nominal fee (in the range of five dollars) a
potential investor could click on the button and obtain the
analyst’s assessment of the issuer.110
An analogous device appears at www.iexchange.com.  At
that site, individuals post their views regarding stocks that are
likely to rise or fall.  The site tracks the accuracy of the picks
and ranks the most accurate predictors based on past perform-
ance.  Those who visit the site can download current picks for a
fee.  The system works by rewarding most profitably those
whose predictions appear to be the most accurate.111
When I first learned of those programs, I thought little of
it.  It seemed to me nothing more than a less grand device to
provide intermediation to small companies, solving the infor-
mation verification problem without the large fees and expenses
associated with traditional investment-bank reputational
intermediation.112  Upon further thought, however, the shift
seems to provide a pointed illustration of why those types of
mechanisms are ideally suited to developing conditions: they
                                                                
109 See Womack Interview, supra note 106 (transcript at 5-6).
110 See Womack Interview, supra note 106 (transcript at 14).
111 For discussion of that site, see Telephone Interview with Clay
Womack, President, Direct Stock Market (Nov. 29, 1999) [transcript on file with
author] (transcript at 4-5).
112 See supra note 56 (citing information about the size of those fees).
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provide more effective verification of the relevant information;
and highly sophisticated information technology is required for
those mechanisms to function successfully.  The following
sections elaborate on those two points.
1.  ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF VERIFICATION
On the first point, a comparison between the traditional
intermediation arrangement and direct sale of the information
suggests that direct sale of the information is superior in two
respects.  First, from the perspective of the potential lender or
investor, direct sale of the information provides a better product
because the motives of the information merchant are not
contaminated by the intermediary’s financial interest in the
issue.113  When investors purchase from an investment bank that
is underwriting an issue, investors have to worry about the
investment bank’s motivation to suppress negative information
that might harm the prospects of a successful issuance.114
Similarly, although less seriously, free information – not backed
by a reputational sanction – is unlikely to be adequately reliable
to alter significantly the structure of transactions.
In contrast, when an investor purchases information
directly from a disinterested third party, the investor has little
reason to worry about mixed motives.  The merchant’s primary
incentive must be to sell information of sufficient accuracy to
support a reputation for accuracy and avoid legal liability for
                                                                
113 Of course, the customer also doesn’t have the comfort of knowing (as
it does in a transaction with an intermediary) that the information comes from
somebody that has put their own money in the same investment.
114 For one particularly disappointing story, see K. EICHENWALD, SERPENT
ON THE ROCK (1995).  Even if reputational constraints can solve that problem, a
less direct conflict arises when (as often happens) the investment bank has a
venture-capital subsidiary that has invested in the issuer.  The available evidence
suggests that the marketplace perceives a substantial conflict of interest in that
arrangement, which is reflected in relatively greater underpricing of such stock
issues.  See Gompers & Lerner, supra note 96, at 20-22.  That problem seems to
be mitigated, however, by the investment banks’ tendency to select a less
information-problematic portfolio of issuers in which they are both an equity
investor at the venture-capital stage and an underwriter at the IPO stage.  See
Gompers & Lerner, supra, at 22-24.
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misrepresentation.  The merchant will suffer much more from a
perception of poor judgment or misrepresentation than it will if an
offering that the merchant assesses fails because of negative
information provided by the merchant.  That situation is directly
contrary to the situation that faces an investment bank
intermediary.115
Of course, the investor might not have access to the
advantageous remedies that the securities laws afford against an
intermediary like an investment bank, but then there are good
reason to doubt the general effectiveness of such remedies.116
Thus, it seems quite plausible to me that a professional, Internet-
based information merchant would be at least as motivated by
pure reputation-based sanctions as a traditional investment bank
would be by the combination of legal sanctions and reputation-
based sanctions.117
To be sure, it is easy to imagine situations in which the
motives of the information merchant could be contaminated.  For
example, consider the outcome of an arrangement in which a
direct-stock-market issuer could prevent analysts from posting
negative reports on the issuer’s home page.118  In that arrange-
                                                                
115 You might think that the information is less reliable because the
information supplier is not putting money on the line.  But that is true only if the
possibility of a loss on the intermediary’s investment in the target is a more
effective sanction than the loss of a reputation of credibility for the information
merchant.  Obviously those two effects will have differing relative weights in
differing circumstances.  My point here is that it is easy to believe that in many
contexts the reputational sanction that verifies information provided by an
information merchant will be more effective than any sanction available against
the conflicted intermediary.
116 See Mann, Verification Institutions, supra note 1, at 2248-49, 2262
n.142 (summarizing some of those difficulties).
117 That view is supported, of course, by my view that reputational
sanctions generally are enhanced by the advances in information technology
discussed in subpart II(A) of this essay.
118 The direct-stock-market issuer might wish to prevent negative
comments because negative comments would be likely to harm the prospects for
the issues as to which the negative comments were made.  If the direct-stock-
market issuer depends on fees from issues posted on its network, it might wish
to deter those negative comments.  Those types of conflicts have become
increasingly controversial as the importance of web-site information has grown.
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ment, the analysts would have a significant financial incentive to
produce positive reports, because only positive reports would be
posted so as to provide revenue to the analyst.  For the
information merchant to provide information that has a credibly
high quality, the arrangement has to limit such contrary
incentives.  That suggests, in turn, that the arrangements will
function most effectively if they include credible disclosures of
the relations among the information merchant and those about
whom the information merchant provides information.  And with
information technology, those disclosures readily could be made
effective through the development of some type of third-party
verification service.119
Direct sale of information also fosters a more competitive
market for the provision of information by unbundling the sale of
information from other services.  In the traditional intermediary
situation, the investment bank provides an array of services to
the issuer including such things as advice on structuring the
issue and expertise at marketing the issue.  Thus, there is no
separate charge to the issuer for the service of reassuring
investors regarding the reliability of the issuer’s assertions about
its operations.
Hence, it is not even clear that the investment bank
provides such a service.  Large, blue-chip companies, for exam-
ple, have little need for verification of their assertions by an
investment bank, because their own reputations provide an
adequate mechanism for verification.  Accordingly, a competi-
tive market would drive total investment-bank charges to those
companies down to a level that included nothing for reputational
intermediation.  Yet the current bundled charge for all invest-
ment-bank services makes it difficult to tell if that occurs
                                                                                                                                                             
See, e.g., Michelle V. Rafter, Cheap, Cheaper, Cheapest (visited Mar. 22, 1999)
http://www.thestandard.com/articles/display/0,1449,3003.00.html (discussing
controversies about finder’s fees that Amazon.com receives from those to whom
it gives favorable site placements and reviews)
119 The obvious model would be something like TRUSTe, which is being
developed to satisfy privacy concerns raised by the Federal Trade Commission.
See Industry Hopes Seal-of-Approval Programs Will Meet Privacy Self-Regulation
Challenge, 67 U.S.L.W. 2396 (1999).
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because it obscures both the provision of information by the
intermediary and the charges imposed for the service of
providing it.
By contrast, when verification is provided directly by a
disinterested third party, all parties know exactly what is being
paid for the information and precisely the format in which the
information is being provided.  Although it is possible that market
will suffer from defects of its own – those discussed above and
others I do not foresee120 – the transparency of that
arrangement should lead to a much more competitive market
than the currently bundled and opaque arrangements, and thus
in the end to more effective provision of information.121
2.  THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
The preceding section explains why it might be better to
have information merchants instead of information intermedi-
aries, but it does nothing to explain why advances in information
technology might support the growth of information merchants.
The free-rider problem that afflicts traditional information
merchants122 continues just as surely in this context. For
example, returning to the anecdote from the preceding section of
the essay, suppose that an analyst expends resources analyzing
a potential issuer and developing a succinct description of the
issuer’s prospects.  The analyst then posts that description at a
                                                                
120 See Choi, supra note 42, at 50-54 (noting the superior abilities of
public regulators to provide certain kinds of information).
121 See Langevoort, supra  note 42, at 15.  That assertion rests in part on
my view that the rapidly decreasing cost of information in Internet markets
already has produced visibly enhanced competition in a variety of markets related
to financing transactions, such as the markets for home-mortgage loans and for
certificates of deposit.  For example, www.lendingtree.com provides a
marketplace in which home-mortgage borrowers can comparison shop for loans
from a large group of mortgage lenders physically located over the entire country.
For statistics, see Hala Habal, Study Sees Steady Growth for Internet-Only
Lenders, AM.  BANKER, Oct. 15, 1999, at 9.  The continuing emergence of new
formats like www.priceline.com can only enhance the general level of
competitiveness.
122 See Mann, Verification Institutions, supra note 1, at 2267-69
(discussing that problem).
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prominent location on the Internet, where potential investors can
purchase it for five dollars.  After the first purchaser pays five
dollars for the information, what is to stop the purchaser from
reselling the same information for one dollar to those who inquire
later, or, indeed, from giving the information away for free?123  If
that free-riding problem offers a substantial explanation for the
general rarity of information markets in the pre-information
technology environment, the low cost of disseminating stolen
information in the information age has the potential to make the
free-riding problem even worse.
Information technology, however, offers three advantages
to those trying to solve that problem and develop functional
information markets.  The first point arises from the direct
lowering of information costs.124  As information technology low-
ers the cost of information (so that the user need only push a
button on a home page instead of placing a telephone call or
ordering the information through the mail), the transaction costs
of purchasing the information directly can fall below the
transaction costs of obtaining it from a pirate.  To put it another
way, when you can obtain information legitimately and directly
by typing in a URL and clicking on a button at the corresponding
Internet site, how much effort will you expend to locate an
information pirate that will give you the information for a lower
price (or for free)?
Similarly, given a perception that it is at best marginally
honest to purchase or obtain information from the pirate, norms
of honesty may limit the likelihood that investors will patronize
information pirates when they can obtain the information
legitimately for a nominal fee.125  Although that might sound
rather implausibly trusting, one of my interview subjects in the
                                                                
123 See Choi, supra note 42, at 47 (noting that problem).
124 This point is borrowed directly from Esther Dyson, Intellectual Value,
WIRED 3.07.
125 For a prominent articulation of that point, see Robert Wright, Dead
Head, SLATE, Oct. 3, 1996 (explaining that the cost of stealing information
includes “informal punishments such as being labeled a cheat or a cheapskate”
and that “[t]he size of th[ose punishments] will depend on how norms in this area
evolve”).
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direct stock market area assured me that the norm against free
riding appears to be the primary backstop on which he is relying
in designing the system described in the previous section of the
essay.  He simply doesn’t believe that a significant number of
investors will download and repackage the information available
from the analysts’ buttons.  Only time will tell if he is correct.
The second advantage is a partial technological solution to
the free-rider problem.  By the use of so-called “trusted sys-
tems,” an information merchant can limit the ability of the pirate
to undercut the merchant’s market by making it difficult for the
pirate to save the information or print it out for dissemination to
other potential customers.126  Those systems have much the
same effect as copy protection had for software in the early
1980’s, and that Macrovision has for VCR tapes now.127
Essentially, those systems provide information in an encrypted
form that can be read only on a terminal that has special
decryption software provided by the merchant.  If the user has a
key that can be obtained from the merchant on a case-by-case
basis, the software decrypts the requested information so that
the user can view (but not save or print) the information.
Without the key, the user cannot even view the information.128
                                                                
126 See Mark Stefik, Trusted Systems, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Mar. 1997, R
78 (discussing the technology of trusted systems).  I thank Paul Resnick for help
on that topic.
127 See Stephen A. Booth, Copy-Proof CDs, POPULAR SCI., Oct. 1, 1999,
at 59 (discussing Macrovision technology and its coming extension to music
CDs); Gordon Brockhouse, Under Wraps, STEREO REV., Nov. 1, 1998, at 38 (dis-
cussing Macrovision technology and its coming extension to home taping of
movies and music); see also ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG,
COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 513-14 (5th ed. 1999) (discussing provisions of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act that will limit home recording of most
programming not disseminated by free over-the-air television).
128 See Stefik, supra note 126.  Digital watermark technology has a
similar purpose, but it does not prevent copying.  Instead, it allows the owner of
the stolen information to identify the source of the stolen information by
examining unique marks placed in the authorized distributed copies of the
information.  See Alan Zeichick, Digital Watermarks Explained, RED HERRING,
Dec. 1999, at 270.
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Those systems cannot solve the free-rider problem
completely  the user could photograph the monitor screen,
transcribe the information, or perhaps compromise the soft-
ware129  but they do substantially raise the transaction costs of
piracy.  In particular, they counteract the cost-reducing effects
of the Internet and computerized information processors,
because now the information thief must reenter the information
manually and upload it to the Internet before disseminating it.
The costs of that operation substantially increase the marginal
cost of the information to the thief, substantially limiting the
thief’s ability to ruin the market of the information merchant.
Taken with the low cost of the information and the intangible
costs of violating anti-piracy norms discussed above, the further
hurdle posed by the trusted systems diminishes the potential for
piracy still further.
The third advantage is also technological, the ability of the
merchant to charge for the information on a bit-by-bit basis.  As
discussed above, one of the key features that should bolster the
efficiency of information markets is the transparency of the
pricing arrangements.  Under traditional payment systems,
however, it would not be cost effective for the merchant to
charge a large number of users separate five-dollar fees for
each item of information that the users obtain.  The transaction
costs of any of the traditional systems for remote payment (with
credit cards being the best existing candidate for instant comple-
tion of remote payment transactions) are too high for such a
system to function effectively.130  Thus, to the extent that infor-
mation merchants have begun imposing fees for their informa-
tion (as a few news providers have done), they generally obtain
payment on a subscription basis, where the user makes a single
                                                                
129 As it happens, Congress recently criminalized the act of compro-
mising such software.  See GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 127, at 773-776 (5th
ed. 1999) (discussing provisions regarding copyright management information).
That strikes me, however, more as evidence that hackers frequently attempt to
compromise such software than as evidence that such attempts promptly will
cease in response to the statute.
130 See MANN, supra note 17, at 270-72 (discussing the reasons for the
current dominance of credit cards as a payment device in Internet transactions).
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monthly payment that allows the user free access to all of the
merchant’s information.131
For many users, the fixed monthly subscription fee might
be an optimal arrangement  how many of us prefer an Internet
service provider that offers unlimited access for a fixed fee? 
but it is unlikely to be an optimal solution for all users, because
the fixed fee is likely to exceed the value that the merchant can
provide to low-volume users.  Thus, the system probably would
work more effectively, attracting a larger volume of customers, if
it were practical for the merchant to offer metered pricing plans
that allowed some users to pay for each item of information that
they obtain.
Information technology offers electronic money as a
nascent solution for that problem.  Essentially, electronic money
is a payment system in which the currency is encrypted
“ecoins” that a purchaser can provide to a merchant as payment
in remote Internet transactions, and for which the merchant can
obtain credit in ordinary funds from the operator that issued
them.132  Electronic money is designed specifically to provide
payment for very large numbers of micro-payment transactions
(eventually as low as small fractions of a single penny) and thus
offers negligible per-item transaction costs.133  Hence, it is an
ideal mechanism for merchants that wish to offer per-item
pricing for the information that they sell.  By facilitating per-item
pricing, electronic money can allow such systems to gain ever
larger user bases, which in turn should lower their average per-
item costs of providing information.
                                                                
131 For general discussion of subscription-based merchants, see Maureen
A. O’Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 MINN.
L. REV. 609, 627, 629-30 (1998).  As I write, prominent examples of the
subscription-fee model include ESPN Insider (at  www.espn.com) and
TheStreet.com.  On the other hand, the New York Times (www.nytimes.com)
charges on a per-article basis (currently $2.50).
132 For a general discussion of electronic-money systems, see MANN,
supra note 17, at 272-80.
133 See MANN, supra note 17, at 272.
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To be sure, it remains to be seen whether there is a
sufficient need for that kind of micro-payments system,134 but
the basic point seems sound: notwithstanding the inability of the
parties to an information transaction to meet face to face, the
technology is available to facilitate reliable and inexpensive
payment for even the smallest transactions.  That can only foster
the spread of the information merchant.
III.  CONCLUSION
Information technology is a literally Protean feature of our
current economic arrangements.  As quickly as we understand
how it solves one problem, innovators apply it to solve a different
problem or engineers develop a better technical device that
collects or analyzes information still more quickly than any
previous device.  Thus, this essay cannot hope to provide an
explanation for where information technology will take us.  I only
hope to offer a preliminary sense of how it will take us there.
The main point of this essay is to highlight one important
aspect of the changes that information technology will bring to
financing transactions, the increasing efficacy with which it will
transmit and process information that affects reputation.
Information technology does not seem the least bit likely to lower
the cost of enforcement through the legal system, but it will bring
a substantial reduction in the costs of the various information-
based mechanisms that provide alternate sanctions.  As those
sanctions improve, they will bear more and more of the weight of
the task of resolving and mitigating the information asymmetries
that are endemic to all financing transactions.135
                                                                
134 See Winn, supra note 17, at 691-702 (discussing the obstacles that
have impeded the spread of electronic-money systems); Alex Gove, Mad Money:
The Atmosphere in Silicon Valley Is Electric from Digital Commerce Deals
http://www.redherring.com/mag/issue39/whispers.html (visited Mar. 24, 1999)
(quoting a leading venture capitalist analyst as arguing that electronic money is
unnecessary because “content providers will find that it is cheaper to give away
content than charge minuscule amounts; customers who make larger purchases
will either pay on a subscription basis or use their credit cards to make
immediate purchases”).
135 I do not mean to suggest that there is no role for government.  Curtis
Milhaupt suggests that the SEC’s activities in the area could develop into
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That has two implications.  First, it suggests that scholars
trying to understand those transactions should spend a greater
portion of their efforts studying the private arrangements
reflected in the design of those transactions and a lesser portion
of their effort studying the formal legal rules that purport to
govern those transactions.  Second, and more chillingly, the
information-based mechanisms function well only with free flows
of information.  As we are just beginning to understand the
privacy issues raised by those free flows,136 it is disconcerting to
understand the importance to the financial sector broadly of
maintaining and even enhancing those flows.  Abrupt termination
of those flows – not nearly as far-fetched a concern as you
might think137 – would have far broader consequences than a
minor lowering of bank-industry profits.
                                                                                                                                                             
something truly useful.  See Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Small Firm Financing
Problem: Private Information and Public Policy, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L.
177, 191-93 (1998).  Also, as Peter Swire has shown, the government can play a
key role in facilitating those sanctions by providing for the standardization of
mandatory information flows that private parties can analyze.  See Peter Swire,
Public Feedback Regulation: Learning To Govern in the Age of Computers,
Telecommunications, and the Media (unpublished 1993 manuscript).
136 For a few critical comments, see Don Clark & John R. Wilke, Firms
To Unveil Plans To Protect On-Line Privacy, available at 1997 WL-WSJ 2423452
(discussing consumer-privacy advocates’ criticisms of consumer information-
service companies); Peter Huber, Tangled Wires: The Intellectual Confusion and
Hypocrisy of the Wired Crowd, SLATE, Oct. 18, 1996 (“Information wanting to be
free doesn’t seem so appealing when it includes details about all your flesh and
frailties – credit history, shopping habits, records of where you’ve been, what you
asked for, and what you took.”).  For more nuanced views, see Swire, supra note
8, at 477-507 (analyzing government access to information); PETER P. SWIRE &
ROBERT E.  LITAN,  NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS,  ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE (1998) (analyzing the difficulties
of implementing the European Privacy Directive in our economy).
137 See Dean Anason, Administration Insists Customers Get a Say in All
Data-Sharing, AM. BANKER, July 22, 1999, at 2 (discussing Clinton administration
proposals that apparently would allow consumers to veto all information sharing
about their transactions with banks).
